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The Brazilian geopolitical 
strategy for the South Atlantic
BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES
1 INTRODUCTION1
The South Atlantic Ocean is currently undergoing a moment of 
rising international importance. There have been many discove-
ries of mineral and oil resources on its basin that brought mariti-
me territorial disputes back to the international agenda. Moreover, 
with the increasingly limited capacity of the Panama and Suez 
Canals (which do not support super-tankers), the relevance of the 
South Atlantic trade routes as a whole has augmented.
Brazil is a crucial actor in this scenario for it has the longest 
coastline in the South Atlantic. Brazil has almost 7500 km of Atlantic 
coastline and 80% of the Brazilian population lives near the coast, 
and 95% of the country’s international trade is carried out through 
South Atlantic oceanic routes (WIESEBRON, 2013). Several natural 
resources were discovered in the Brazilian Exclusive Economic 
Zone (ZEE), but most importantly oil and gas were discovered in 
deep waters of the South Atlantic in 2006 (the “Pré-Sal”). In full 
operation, the oil reserves would make Brazil one of the world’s 
top ten oil producers (WIESEBRON, 2013).
Furthermore, Brazil gradually enhances its role in the 
international system, and as an emerging power, it is important 
to analyze its rise to watch if it is going to be peaceful or not. 
That is why observing the Brazilian geopolitical strategy is vital 
to understanding the evolution of the international system as a 
whole. Therefore, this research focuses on Brazil’s geopolitical 
strategy and its policies towards the South Atlantic, trying to 
1  I thank the comments on earlier versions of this piece by fellow researchers 
Marcela Ávila, Julian Fitz, Jéssica Höring, Giovana Zucatto, João Arthur Reis, 
David Ramin Jalilvand and Iara Binta Machado and the assistance of Prof. Lucas 
Kerr and Prof. Analúcia Pereira. I also thank the pertinent comments of World 
Tensions’ reviewers.
BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES
296  |  TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 295-322, 2016
explain what has been the Brazilian geopolitical strategy for the 
ocean since the year 2000 and considering its recent ascent in the 
international scene.
The research will mainly draw from Therezinha de Castro’s 
theoretical approach to Oceanopolítica (Ocean-politics, in 
opposition to geo-politics) and Julian Corbett’s conceptualization 
on naval strategy.2 The hypothesis is that Brazil seeks the 
command of the South Atlantic, but it still does not have the 
necessary conditions for this purpose. To achieve this goal, Brazil 
would strive to establish naval military bases and enhance naval 
cooperation in strategic regions of the South Atlantic, while trying 
to restrain the presence of extra-regional powers.
2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Castro (2002) states there are many ways of delimitating the 
South Atlantic, especially concerning its northern part. For her the 
most practical way would be to consider the northern extremity 
of the South Atlantic to be the chokepoint between Natal, a city 
on the Brazilian northeastern salience, and Dakar, Senegal — 
the northernmost Sub-Saharan country in West Africa. However, 
a historical delimitation is better suited for understanding its 
geopolitics. Regions of Portuguese colonization should be 
considered as a whole. Consequently, the South Atlantic’s 
northern limit is considered to be between the northernmost part 
of the Brazilian coast (Amapá State) and Cape Verde. The limits 
to the South, East and West are easier to define: the Antarctic, 
the Cape of Good Hope and the Beagle/Magallanes/Drake Straits, 
respectively (CASTRO, 2002).
The ocean currents of the South Atlantic, albeit not as powerful 
a binding force as the ones in the North Atlantic, are natural 
2 Beyond the inherent qualities present in Therezinha de Castro’s approach, 
particularly concerning the geopolitics of Brazil and the South Atlantic, I have 
chosen to highlight her framework because it stands out as a contribution by 
both a civilian and a woman in a field largely dominated by the writings of 
members of the Armed forces and men, such as the  widely known Gen. Golbery 
do Couto e Silva and Gen. Carlos de Meira Mattos.
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connecting circuits between Africa and South America. Their 
importance for commercial maritime routes has been vital since 
Portuguese colonization, bringing together Brazil, Angola and 
the Gulf of Guinea.3 Moreover, islands in the South Atlantic are 
“security trampolines”, which have served as support for these sea 
lanes (CASTRO, 2002).
Castro (2002) identifies three “insular trampolines”, which have 
historically been vital for the command of the South Atlantic since 
the Age of Discovery from Portugal in the late 15th century to the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) today. The first is 
the triangle of the Ascension, Saint Helena and Tristan da Cunha 
Islands. It is vital for the route to the Indic Ocean and for power 
projection towards Sub-Saharan Africa. The second is composed 
by Fernando de Noronha, Trindade and Malvinas/Falkland 
Islands, which have served to control the route to the Pacific 
and the Magallanes/Beagle Strait as well as incursions towards 
South America.4 The third trampoline is closer to the Antarctic 
but interpenetrates the other two. It effectively challenges the 
preponderance of the African and South American continents over 
the other routes. The Shetland, South Sandwich, Gough and South 
Georgia Islands compose it.
Accordingly, three broad strategic regions can be identified for 
the dominion of the South Atlantic. First, the Brazilian northeast and 
West Africa (particularly Cape Verde and Senegal) due to the naval 
chokepoint between South America and Africa. Second, the three 
insular trampolines, because they are vital for South Atlantic sea 
lanes. Lastly, the Brazilian and African coasts, especially between 
Angola and the Gulf of Guinea to the east and Recife and Rio de 
Janeiro to the west, since they are interconnected by South Atlantic 
3 The main cities interconnected by the South Atlantic currents are Luanda 
(Angola), São Tomé (São Tomé and Príncipe), Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and 
Recife (Brazil). Recife is particularly important for its location is where the sea 
current from Africa divides: one going to the North, towards the Caribbean and 
the other to the South, towards Rio de Janeiro (ALENCASTRO, 2000).
4 Fernando de Noronha is also strategically significant to project power from 
the American continent towards West Africa (CASTRO, 2002).  
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currents. Consequently, a strategy for the command of the ocean 
as vented by our hypothesis has to take these factors into account.
Nevertheless, Corbett (1911) notices that naval warfare does 
not exist devoid of a context of disputes on land. Marine strategy, 
thus, has to be based on the assumption that war on the sea is 
part of war on land. Command of the sea is linked to the use of 
the sea for war goals. Corbett (1911) emphasizes it only exists in 
a state of war: “If we say we have command of the sea in time of 
peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate 
Naval positions; an adequate fleet to secure the command when 
war breaks out” (CORBETT, 1911, p. 318).
Moreover, Corbett does not believe that command of the sea 
means the complete destruction of the enemy fleet. For him, 
command of the sea does not come from unlimited freedom of 
action in the sea or from the control of determined territorial 
waters. As Proença Jr., Diniz and Raza (1999) point out, Corbett’s 
idea of command of the sea is rather circumstantial, rooted on 
the ability of using the sea, not on complete dominion over it. 
Therefore, “Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can 
do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot seriously interfere with 
the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of war, 
or to force our will upon him” (CORBETT, 1911, p. 318, emphasis 
in the original). In other words, for Corbett, the command of the 
sea means the opponent cannot significantly obstruct war and 
commerce activities. The enemy may still have an active fleet, but it 
is incapable of changing the course of war and political outcomes.
Following this definition, Corbett (1911) considers that the 
command of the sea may be temporary or permanent as well 
as general or local. Temporary command is when one is able to 
prevent the enemy from interfering with a particular operation or 
campaign during the period required for that operation (CORBETT, 
1911). Conversely, permanent command does not compute time, 
i.e. “when the possibility of the enemy’s recovering his maritime 
position is too remote to be a practical consideration” (CORBETT, 
1911, p. 319). General command of the sea is achieved when the 
enemy is no longer able to dangerously obstruct lines of passage 
and communication and to defend his own. On the other hand, 
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local command implies that one can prevent the enemy from 
interfering in one or more specific theatres of operation.
Combining Corbett’s and Castro’s works, the general command 
of the South Atlantic is expressed through the control of the insular 
trampolines, which suffices for the maintenance of trade routes. 
These islands are enough to guarantee South Atlantic sea lanes 
and to interfere with their use by other forces. Currently, the UK 
possesses most of the islands of the insular trampolines, which are 
also used by the US as military bases. Because both usually work 
together on military issues, they are considered to have permanent 
general command over the ocean (PENHA, 2011). Consequently, 
the Brazilian strategy for the command of the South Atlantic as 
devised in our hypothesis would have to consider diminishing 
Washington’s and London’s presence in the ocean and somehow 
acquiring facilities in these islands. In other words, Brazil seeks 
general and permanent command of the ocean.
3 BRAZIL’S INTERNACIONAL INSERTION STRATEGY 
In the 21st century, Brazil has pursued an international insertion 
strategy that privileges two main points. Regional integration is at 
its core. In the year 2000, after the several economic crises that 
afflicted South American countries in the late 1990s, Brazilian 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) made a 
counter-intuitive choice of deepening the regional integration 
process. When Mercosul5 seemed to fail, the Brazilian policy 
actually perceived integration as a means to escape the economic 
crisis in the bloc: They would not be as dependent on foreign 
countries as before, i.e. they would diminish their vulnerability to 
foreign markets through integration (VIZENTINI, 2005). Cardoso, 
then, not only tried to bind together Mercosul member-states, but 
also sought to establish a continental integration process, which 
would later culminate in the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUL) under President Lula. 
5 Southern Common Market, a free trade area and customs union created by 
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in the 1990s.
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Despite their different political leanings, both shared the 
perception (even if Cardoso only noticed it in his last years in 
office) that South America should be at the core of the Brazilian 
international insertion strategy. President Lula, during his eight 
years in office, had more time to develop this strategy, which 
has also been followed by President Dilma Rousseff.6 In practical 
terms, under his presidency the country forged its leadership status 
by pushing forward South American integration and Mercosul’s 
revamping. International negotiations were also strongly affected 
by the South American bloc, which together could ask for more 
concessions from developed countries. According to Vizentini 
(2005), the priority given to South American integration offered all 
neighboring countries a necessary partnership to resume economic 
growth and it effectively reversed the global trend towards the 
region’s marginalization. Continental integration is thus their only 
global strategy to ensure development and governability in South 
America, while being a necessary instrument for negotiations with 
other countries (VIZENTINI, 2005; 2007).
Thereby, Brazil would gain more weight in the international 
scene, since, together, the South American countries could bargain 
and achieve more than negotiating alone. The idea behind this is 
that Brazil’s future is tied to the future of its neighbors and it is only 
through this that Brazil can aspire to have a greater role in world 
politics. In fact, considering that a new balance of power is taking 
shape in the emerging multipolarity, Brazil tries to consolidate a 
united South America which is peaceful and stable. Silva (2013) and 
Celso Amorim (2013) argue that, if this is achieved, the continent 
itself could become a new pole in a multipolar world.
Thus, South American integration embodies three Brazilian 
goals (STUENKEL, 2013). The first is to establish the region as a 
shield against external interference and shocks, be they political or 
economic. For example, a greater integration of South American 
markets could protect Brazil (and other countries too) against 
6 Michel Temer’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Serra, seems to have 
abandoned regional cordiality and started to implement a foreign policy in 
which South America is no longer central (CASARÕES, 2016; REZENDE, 2016).
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unfair competition coming from China or elsewhere. Similarly, 
political interference by the US in the affairs of the region could 
be avoided, if the countries together are willing to solve their 
problems on their own. The second goal is to create a stable and 
peaceful environment that enables the further development of the 
continent. For that, Brazil takes on the role of regional leader and 
its ensuing responsibilities. Stuenkel (2013) argues that Brazil may 
even be ready to act unilaterally to ensure regional stability. Yet, 
there remains a strong preference for collective action to solve 
South America’s problems. Lastly, regional integration represents 
a launch pad for global power. If Brazil is seen as the leader of an 
integrated South America, the country’s weight in global affairs 
would doubtlessly be greater, coming close to the status of global 
power.
The second part of the Brazilian international insertion 
strategy since 2000, along with regional integration, is the idea 
of establishing closer relations with other developing countries to 
thereby diversify global partnerships. In the words of the former 
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Minister of Defense 
Celso Amorim:
At the crossroads of all the main guidelines of 
Brazilian foreign policy is the effort to establish 
closer relations with other developing 
countries. South-South cooperation is a 
diplomatic strategy that originates from an 
authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward 
poorer countries. At the same time, it helps 
expand Brazil’s participation in world affairs. 
Cooperation among equals in matters of 
trade, investment, science and technology 
and other fields reinforces our stature and 
strengthens our position in trade, finance 
and climate negotiations. Last but not 
least, building coalitions with developing 
countries is also a way of engaging in the 
reform of global governance in order to make 
international institutions fairer and more 
democratic (AMORIM, 2010, p. 231).
In practical terms, Brazil has sought partners outside the 
western hemisphere to amplify its influence in the international 
scene through a more active and pragmatic posture. Brazil thus 
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uses South-South cooperation to balance its international insertion 
vis-à-vis developed countries and international capital flows. It does 
not mean that the country ignored its relations with the developed 
world nor that it abandoned established international regimes, but 
rather that South-South relations were used to balance the power 
wielded by developed countries in world politics, especially in 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).
Hence, Brazil’s relations with African countries are paramou-
nt to this strategy, because they tie together ethical principles 
and national interests (VIZENTINI, 2005). Moreover, relations 
with other emerging powers (BRICS,7 for instance) evidence the 
Brazilian objective of contributing to the establishment of a multi-
polar international system. Therefore, according to Vizentini 
(2005), Brazil seeks more room for bargaining and a more demo-
cratic alternative to the dominion of the developed world in inter-
national relations.
Regional integration and diversification of global partners seem 
to be in line with our hypothesis. To achieve the command of the 
South Atlantic, Brazil would have to engage regions other than 
the West, especially in Africa, and participate in institutions which 
shun western involvement. The next section will describe recent 
developments regarding Brazil’s multilateral and bilateral relations 
in the South Atlantic.
4 SOUTH ATLANTIC RELATIONS
4.1 Multilateral relations
There are four multilateral frameworks for Brazilian relations 
with South Atlantic states: the Rio Pact, the Zone of Peace and 
Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), the Community of 
Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and the South American 
Defense Council (SDC). Whereas the former has lost its importan-
ce and the latter’s main concern is not the South Atlantic per se, 
7 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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the ZPCSA and the CPLP have emerged as important forums for 
cooperation on issues regarding the ocean.
The Rio Pact (officially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance) was crafted between 1936 and 1947 under the spectrum 
of World War II and the Cold War.8 It was based on continental 
solidarity and reciprocal assistance against external and internal 
aggression. However, there have never been regular armed forces 
nor institutionalization for the Pact. It is rather a defensive military 
alliance without means to assure its implementation. This means 
the countries cannot really assist each other in the event of an 
attack (CASTRO, 2002).
The treaty has been invoked only thrice since its inception: 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 
the Malvinas/Falkands War. The most meaningful event was 
the latter. For most of the Latin American states, the lack of US 
support to Argentina in the war against the UK has effectively 
proven that the Rio Pact was an outdated instrument deprived 
of any geopolitical value (CASTRO, 1997; 2002). It had shown 
that the region could not count on the US to protect them from 
external attacks. Right before the US started the war against Iraq 
in 2003, Mexico was the first country to officially withdraw from 
the treaty.9 Since then Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador 
have followed suit, clearly showing regional discontent with the 
American foreign policy.
Although Brazil is still part of the Rio Pact, it tries to lessen 
the importance of the treaty. Especially after the creation of the 
South American Defense Council, Brazil perceives that the security 
of South America is primarily a responsibility of South American 
countries themselves without direct influence from the US 
(PAGLIARI, 2015).
8 The US was its main sponsor, fearing the rising influence of Nazi Germany 
and of the Soviet Union in Latin America. Its first and foremost characteristic 
is the collective self-defense against interventions from external powers in 
the Americas. The Rio Pact was regarded as the embodiment of the Monroe 
Doctrine (“America for Americans”).
9 Cuba had already withdrawn from the treaty in 1960 after the revolution 
when diplomatic ties with the US were severed.
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Nevertheless, the SDC is not aimed at extra-regional concerns. 
It has arguably been the most important framework for Brazil on 
security issues since its inception in 2008, but its only scope is South 
America itself. South Atlantic issues are tangential to the agenda. 
Still, the SDC condemned the British occupation of the Malvinas/
Falklands and prohibited ships bearing the Falkland flag from docking 
in South American ports (GOMES GUIMARÃES, 2015a; 2015b).
The main multilateral framework employed by Brazil for South 
Atlantic affairs is the ZPCSA. In the 2000s, the forum was revitalized 
through Angolan initiative and Brazilian backing. It was launched 
in 1986 with strong Brazilian and Nigerian support.10 Both countries 
wanted to curb the influence of former colonialist powers in the 
South Atlantic and to distance the ocean from the geopolitical 
East-West divide of the Cold War. Therefore, the ZPCSA’s 
establishment aimed at avoiding the presence of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMDs) in the region as well as the presence of extra-
regional powers in the ocean (a move somewhat reminiscent of a 
“Monroe Doctrine for the South Atlantic”). Its reinvigoration in the 
2000s focused rather on economic cooperation, the fight against 
illicit activities and organized crime, peacekeeping and peace 
operations, and scientific research (environmental and maritime 
issues). Yet, for the first time, the ZPCSA member-states called on 
the UK to end its occupation of the Malvinas/Falkand islands.
In 2013 Brazil proposed a further deepening of relations among 
ZPCSA’s member-states, including over security issues. The 
Brazilian Defense Minister, Celso Amorim, offered to share know-
how on continental shelf mapping, capacity building for rescue 
operations in the sea, peace operations, and maritime surveillance 
through long range identification and tracking (BRASIL, 2013). 
Besides that, Brazil also suggested the creation of ZPCSA seminars 
about South Atlantic defense.
10 The initiative was supported by three South American countries and 21 
African ones. The UN General Assembly recognized it almost unanimously in 
1986. The US voted against it, and Germany, France, Portugal, Italy, and a few 
other former colonial powers abstained in the voting procedures. After the end 
of the Cold War, many analysts wrongly thought that ZPCSA had lost its raison 
d’être.
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Likewise, Brazil advocated within CPLP for the establishment 
of a comprehensive initiative for continental shelf mapping around 
the same time. There were two main tangible goals: the creation 
of a CPLP Ocean Atlas and the extension of the member-states’ 
continental shelves (particularly in Africa). On security issues, 
Brazil hosted the Operação Felino. It was a series of military drills on 
the Brazilian coast within the framework of CPLP to train member-
states’ Armed Forces for peace operations. In other words, Brazil 
wanted to create a “maritime mentality” within CPLP. Although 
there are members in all continents, the initiatives were directed 
at the South Atlantic (ABDENUR; SOUZA NETO, 2014).
Brazilian behavior in multilateral institutions concerning the 
South Atlantic seems to corroborate our hypothesis. On the one 
hand, Brazil tries to distance itself from frameworks which include 
the US. Eschewing the main extra-regional power of the ocean 
implies Brasília is pursuing greater autonomy in the region. Even 
if Brazilian policies do not unequivocally point to a command of 
the sea pursuit, they do demonstrate Brazil’s willingness to at 
least curb extra-regional influence in the South Atlantic. On the 
other hand, Brasília tries to increase the state capacity of African 
counterparts, raising awareness on South Atlantic issues either 
through ZPCSA or CPLP. On both sides of the ocean, Brazil aims at 
strengthening South Atlantic identity, stressing common needs and 




In South America, Argentina has the most security issues 
related to the South Atlantic. It has territorial claims over seve-
ral South Atlantic islands, which are currently under British domi-
nion, namely the Malvinas/Falklands, South Georgia and South 
Sandwich islands. All of which are part of the insular trampolines 
identified by Castro.
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Ever since the Malvinas/Falklands War in the 1980s, the 
Argentinean navy has been severely debilitated (PETERSEN, 2012). 
The country still has ambitions to revamp its fleet and upgrade it, 
but it has met no success due to budgetary limitations. Currently, 
the Argentinean Navy has 19,000 soldiers plus 7,200 civilian 
personnel and 2,500 marines. It possesses three tactical submari-
nes, five destroyers, six frigates, 17 patrol vessels, 18 amphibious 
warships, and 26 logistical support ships (IISS, 2016). 
Brazilian relations with Argentina underwent a remarkable 
transformation in the late 20th century, from continental rivalry 
to close cooperation: They are considered to be the driving motor 
of South American integration. Under the scope of UNASUL and 
the SDC, Brazil has supported the Argentinean claim over the 
Malvinas/Falklands.
Concerning the South Atlantic, Brazil and Argentina have staged 
many military exercises with their navies. Bilaterally there have 
been five since the year 2000 under the name “Operation Araex”. 
With the participation of Uruguay there have been others such as 
Transamerica, Temperex and Atlasur. The latter also includes South 
Africa. All these exercises aim at confidence building between the 
nations. Their scenarios include the protection of sea trade routes 
and halting invasions (VAZ, 2011). There have also occurred the 
exercises called Operação Fraterno (loosely translated as Brotherly 
Operation), which simulates amphibious operations involving the 
armies as well as the navies of both countries. On some occasions, 
South Africa has been invited to these.
4.2.2 Uruguay
Brazil’s relations with Uruguay have been of cooperation 
since the beginning of the 20th century, when the borders were 
agreed upon with Brazil unilaterally ceding coastal territory to 
Uruguay.11 Because it is a small country, the Uruguayan navy 
reflects this characteristic. It comprises 5,400 soldiers, including 
the coast guard. There is also a naval infantry of 450 soldiers. 
Uruguay possesses 33 warships: two frigates, 15 patrol vessels, 
11 For a broader discussion, see Gomes Guimarães; Sebben; Duarte (2011).
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three minesweepers, three amphibious ships, and 10 for support 
and logistics (IISS, 2016).
Brazil also has staged several military naval exercises with 
Uruguay. In these, the navies simulate scenarios in which they 
have to keep marine trade routes free from external interference 
in the South Atlantic. They also engage in scenarios of combat 
against illegal activities, such as drug smuggling, in their territorial 
waters. These bilateral military exercises are called Uruex. As 
mentioned earlier, Uruguay has also participated in multilateral 
military exercises, namely Transamerica, Temperex and Atlasur.
4.3 Sub-Saharan Africa
4.3.1 Nigeria
Nigeria has been Brazil’s main partner in Africa since its inde-
pendence. Currently, bonds that tie them together range from trade 
to political and cultural ones. Their relations have been elevated 
to the status of a strategic partnership in 2013. Brazilian support 
to Nigeria’s political role in its region, through the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and in the African 
continent as a whole, illustrates the fact.
Nigeria has the strongest navy in West Africa with 8,000 soldiers, 
including the coast guard. The country possesses one frigate, one 
corvette, 114 patrol vessels, five amphibious warships, 10 logistic 
and support ships and two ships for mine countermeasures (IISS, 
2016). However, according to The Military Balance 2013, much of this 
equipment is unfit for long deployments due to deterioration (IISS, 
2013). The main challenges faced by the Nigerian Navy are Niger 
Delta militants and piracy. Therefore, most of the procurement is 
focused on coastal and offshore patrol vessels.
2010 was of special significance to Brazil-Nigeria relations. 
It was the year when the first ECOWAS-Brazil Summit was held, 
in which Brazil supported Nigerian leadership once again, and a 
military agreement between the two countries was negotiated. In 
this accord, Brazil pledged to train Nigerian navy officers and provide 
military vessels. These programs have been ongoing since then.
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4.3.2 South Africa
South Africa’s location is very strategic due to the connection 
between the Indic and the South Atlantic Oceans. Today appro-
ximately 60% of the oil coming from the Middle East to Europe 
and North America is transported by South Africa (FIORI; PADULA; 
VATER, 2012).
Although its Navy has historically been under British tutelage 
(PENHA, 2011), independent maritime security is a growing 
concern for South Africa due to piracy in the Indic. Having 7,650 
soldiers on duty, the South African Navy is comprised of three 
tactical submarines, four frigates, six patrol vessels, six amphibious 
warships, eight ships for logistics, and two mine hunters (IISS, 
2016). Were it concentrated in the South Atlantic, it would be the 
strongest African navy in the ocean. Yet, the country has to divide 
forces between both oceans. This makes the weight of the South 
African Navy lesser than what would be desirable (KORNEGAY, 
2013; IISS, 2013).
South Africa has become one of Brazil’s most important 
political partners, reaching the degree of strategic partnership in 
2010.12 Through Brazilian initiative, South Africa was included 
in the BRIC forum (Brazil, Russia, India and China), now called 
BRICS. Moreover, another forum was developed between the two 
countries plus India in the 2000s, the India–Brazil–South Africa 
Forum (IBSA). Within these institutions Brazil has shown support 
for the South African role in the security arena in Southern Africa 
(VAZ, 2011). 
A military cooperation agreement was signed between Brazil 
and South Africa in 2003. The navies of both countries work in 
close cooperation to ensure the protection of the maritime borders 
as well as the access to South Atlantic routes (KORNEGAY, 2013). 
There have been joint military exercises, namely Atlasur (with 
Argentina and Uruguay), IBSAMAR (with India) and Fraterno 
(with Argentina, too). The countries have also worked together 
12 Brazil had very limited diplomatic relations with South Africa during the 
Apartheid. On the one hand, there was a desire to cooperate on security issues, 
but, on the other, Brazil tried to deepen its ties with other Sub-Saharan African 
countries (and, for this, relations with Pretoria were an obstacle). Once the 
Apartheid ended, however, bilateral relations took off (PEREIRA, 2010).
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to develop the 5th generation A-Darter air-to-air missiles, which 
will be adapted to fit the Brazilian Gripen NG fighter jets.13 Both 
countries are currently further negotiating the development of 
cargo aircraft, surface-to-air missile, and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(VAZ, 2011; KORNEGAY, 2013).
4.3.3 Angola
Angola is one of Brazil’s key partners in Africa. Not only becau-
se of their shared history, but bilateral relations have been intense 
since the year 2000, becoming a strategic partnership in 2010.14 
Oil was one of the main reasons their ties resumed in the 1970s 
(Brazil sought alternative sources in the context of the oil crises). 
Currently, Petrobras, a Brazilian partially state-owned company, is 
present in Angola, where it drills deepwater oil. A myriad of other 
Brazilian companies is also present in Angolan markets, not to 
mention cultural and academic exchanges.
Angola and Brazil are very close to each other also on South 
Atlantic issues. They increased exchanges between their navies 
since 2000. The Angolan Navy has approximately 1,000 combatants 
and 22 patrol vessels (IISS, 2016). Despite its size, it is regionally 
significant (IISS, 2013).15 Brazil has also started to map the Angolan 
continental shelf. This program, named LEPLACA (Survey Program 
of the Angolan Continental Shelf), is a bilateral initiative under the 
aegis of ZPCSA. Within CPLP, Brazil has also been preparing the 
13 In December 2013, Brazil announced the acquisition of the 4.5th generation 
Swedish fighter jets known as Gripen New Generation (NG). Sweden and Brazil 
will jointly develop the warplane, including adaptations for aircraft carriers (see 
OLIVEIRA et al., 2013).
14 Under Portuguese colonization, the level of commerce between the two was 
greater than theirs with Portugal (PENHA, 2011). In fact, when Brazil became 
independent, there was a strong political movement in Angola in favor of 
joining the Brazilian Empire instead of remaining under Portuguese colonial 
rule (PENHA, 2011). However, after the severance of ties due to the end of the 
slave trade and the British trade dominance, relations between both countries 
became almost non-existent. Brazil and Angola’s rapprochement started in the 
1970s after the latter’s decolonization. Despite Brazilian right-wing dictatorship 
at the time and Angolan communist government, Brazil became the first country 
to recognize Angolan independence. Bilateral relations took off and they have 
remained a Brazilian priority ever since.
15  This is especially true in the context of the Gulf of Guinea.
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Angolan section of the organization’s Ocean Atlas. Both countries 
also conduct joint research in the fields of shipbuilding (cargo 
ships), defense, and public security (FIORI; PADULA; VATER, 2012). 
The fall in oil prices has halted negotiations for the acquisition of 
Brazilian patrol-boats (IISS, 2016).
4.3.4 Namibia
Since Namibian independence, Brazil has cooperated with the 
country, especially concerning the protection of the ocean. In fact, 
the Brazilian Navy is the main responsible for the creation of the 
Namibian one. Currently it has approximately 200 soldiers for eight 
patrol vessels and five ships for logistics and support (IISS, 2016). 
Quite small, the Namibian navy is part of the Ministry of Fisheries.
Programs have been bilaterally established by Brazil with 
Namibia to train navy officers and sailors since the beginning of 
the 1990s. These were further deepened in the 2000s through the 
Naval Cooperation Agreement (NCA). Under it, Brazil has helped to 
create and train the Namibian Marine Corps, besides assisting the 
establishment of the Maritime Patrol Service of Namibia. To date 
hundreds of Namibians graduated in the Brazilian Navy War School.
Under the NCA, Brazil has also mapped the continental shelf of 
the country. The mapping activities ended in 2007. Brazil has also 
donated several warships and patrol boats to the country, most 
noticeably the Corvette Purus in 2004, which was decommissio-
ned in 2012. Furthermore, Brazil has a permanent Naval Mission in 
Walvis Bay, one of the best natural ports in southwestern Africa.16
4.3.5 Others
Brazil has also increased its influence in other South Atlantic 
African countries since the 2000s. The energy company Petrobras 
has had a significant presence in offshore drilling in Gabon and 
16  This permanent naval mission is not the same as a military base. There are 
no warships and only a few military attachés are deployed to this mission in 
order to regularly train Namibian marine soldiers.  
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Congo Brazzaville. With Guinea-Bissau, Brazil has a military agree-
ment which helped constitute the country’s first Security Forces 
through the Brazilian Mission of Techno-Military Cooperation 
(FIORI; PADULA; VATER, 2012). Warships, patrol boats, and naval 
uniforms were donated to the country. The same gesture was 
extended to São Tomé and Príncipe.17 Both Guinea-Bissau and São 
Tomé and Príncipe have been part of the initiative of mapping the 
ocean floor through the CPLP. Brazil opened an embassy in the 
latter in 2003 for strategic purposes: The archipelago is central for 
the Gulf of Guinea (AMORIM, 2013). Finally, Brazil has also sold a 
corvette to Equatorial Guinea in a deal which included the training 
of officers and sailors. Naval instructors have been sent to Benin 
by the Brazilian Navy. Brazil has also signed a military agreement 
with Senegal. More recently, in 2013, Brazil inaugurated a perma-
nent naval mission in Cape Verde to assist in the training of coast 
guards.
4.4 The 3United States
Brazil has been cautious about the American presence in the 
South Atlantic. This has been so especially since the US suppor-
ted a coup attempt in Venezuela in 2002 and quickly recognized 
the Paraguayan government after a successful coup in 2012. These 
resulted in smaller US political involvement in the region, but they 
also meant a higher military presence (BANDEIRA, 2008).18
The US Navy has traditionally divided its forces 50/50 between 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. However, it has begun to shift this 
balance towards the Pacific to achieve a 40/60 division. Currently, 
17 The fact that the donation of warships to these African countries has actually 
increased the demand in the military industry in Brazil is also noteworthy.
18 Moreover, the disclosure of classified US documents about the Brazilian 
military coup in 1964 has shown that the country had enormous influence in the 
events that took place and even had military plans to enforce the coup in case 
it was needed (BANDEIRA, 2008). These plans included a large naval operation 
in the South Atlantic (called “Big Brother”) (REIS, 2011; BANDEIRA, 2008). On 
top of this, in the eyes of Brazil and other Latin American countries, the US did 
not fulfill its obligation under the Rio Pact during the Malvinas/Falklands War 
(CASTRO, 1997; 2002).
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the navy has 326,800 soldiers (IISS, 2016). The US possesses 
71 submarines, 14 of which are armed with nuclear warheads. 
The country also has 10 aircraft carriers, 22 cruisers, 62 destro-
yers, four frigates, 57 patrol vessels, 11 anti-mines warships, two 
command ships, and 275 amphibious, besides 71 boats for logisti-
cs and support (IISS, 2016). The US also has an inactive fleet of one 
aircraft carrier, one support boat, and 12 amphibious, which can 
be reactivated in 60–90 days notice (IISS, 2016). The Navy Special 
Warfare Command has 9,850 soldiers, according to the IISS (2016), 
and the Marine Special Operations Command has 3,000. Besides 
that, the country also possesses a Military Sealift Command, which 
has roughly 150 ships for logistics and support. The US Coast Guard 
is composed of 40,000 military personnel and 8,300 civilians (IISS, 
2016). It possesses 163 patrol vessels and 394 logistics and support 
ships (IISS, 2016).
The US is militarily present in the South Atlantic Ocean on the 
British Ascension Island—part of one of the insular trampolines 
identified by Castro (2002)—where it has one detection and trac-
king radar. The US is also present through the IV Fleet, which was 
reactivated in 2008 shortly after the discovery of huge oil fields in 
the Brazilian offshore. The reasons presented by the US for the 
reactivation were the combat against illicit trafficking and enhan-
cing regional security (BANDEIRA, 2008)19. The US also has two 
military commands for the region, the USSOUTHCOM since 1963 
(for South America) and the AFRICOM since 2007 (for Sub-Saharan 
Africa). There are 250 American soldiers deployed in Niger and 300 
in Cameroon (IISS, 2016). The US also provides minor troop contri-
butions to peace operations in Mali and Liberia.20
Regardless of the mistrust, Brazil often engages the US Navy 
in joint naval military exercises with other South American coun-
tries, but not regularly.21 US warships have often come to Brazilian 
19 It must be noted, however, that the IV Fleet does not have any permanently 
assigned warships. Currently it maintains only a command structure and 
deployments occur only on a case by case basis.
20  10 soldiers in Mali and four military observers in Liberia (IISS, 2016).
21 However, there are joint aerial military exercises twice a year. One of them, 
Cruzex, is considered to be the largest military exercise of Latin America.
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ports to replenish supplies in the 2000s, even though there is no 
specific bilateral agreement for that (ALBUQUERQUE, 2010). More 
recently, since 2012, Brazil has participated yearly in the Obangame 
Express naval drills led by the US in the Gulf of Guinea. These inclu-
de anti-piracy operations and combat to other illicit activities in 
the eastern South Atlantic. Brazilian participation set off with mili-
tary observers only, but, since 2014, patrol warships have been 
sent to the exercises as well (COMANDO…, 2016; SOARES, 2015; 
ABDENUR; SOUZA NETO, 2014). Many European and African 
countries have taken part too.
4.5 The United Kingdom
Brazil is very wary of the UK in the South Atlantic — after all 
the country controls most of the islands of the insular trampolines 
identified by Castro (2002). The history of the relations between 
the two in the 19th century show that Brazil has good reason to 
be cautious.22 Brazil backed Argentina in the Malvinas/Falklands 
War and it has also officially supported Argentina’s claims over the 
South Atlantic islands under British possession. However, this has 
not had any effect on the relations between Brasília and London, 
including after the prohibition of Falkland ships from docking in 
South American ports issued by the SDC (FIORI; PADULA; VATER, 
2012).
The British Royal Navy has 32,500 soldiers on duty. It possesses 
10 submarines, four of which are armed with nuclear warheads, 
six destroyers, 13 frigates, 22 patrol vessels, 16 ships of mine 
countermeasures, three amphibious ships, and 10 ships for 
logistics and support (IISS, 2016). The Royal Navy does not have 
aircraft-carriers currently, but two new ones should be delivered 
soon and become fully operational as early as 2018.
22 The UK threatened bombing Brazilian ports, raised a blockade in Rio de 
Janeiro and sank many ships in what was known as the Christie Incident, which 
culminated in the severance of diplomatic ties between the countries for a 
decade. Brazil in fact almost declared war against the British Empire back then. 
Moreover, due to the naval campaign waged by the Royal Navy against slave 
trade, commercial ties between Brazil and Africa were immensely affected. In 
fact, the blow was so strong that Brazil completely distanced itself from Africa 
for almost a century after that (PENHA, 2011).
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The UK has forces deployed throughout the South Atlantic. 
The most significant military presence is in the Malvinas/Falkland 
Islands, where approximately 1,100 troops are permanently on 
duty (IISS, 2016). There have been deployments to the Ascension 
Island, Mali and Sierra Leone of about 30 soldiers each (IISS, 2016). 
A Royal Navy destroyer has also been permanently patrolling the 
South Atlantic (IISS, 2013).
Relations have been cordial between the UK and Brazil in 
the 21st century. As such, Brazil has commissioned the building 
of British destroyers for its Navy. These orders, however, have 
been made without much planning: Brazil bought them in “sell-
out” situations, when other countries cancelled their contracts 
with the UK (OLIVEIRA; CEPIK; BRITES, 2013). Quite interestingly, 
the British warships bought by Brazil have sailed to many South 
Atlantic African countries before coming to Brazil. Yet, there have 
been no military exercises between Brazilian and British navies 
since 2000.
4.6 France
Similar to the UK, France has also attacked Brazilian coastal 
cities in the past. This engendered a very cautious behavior from 
Brazil, who has been very suspicious of French intentions in the 
South Atlantic.23 It is particularly true concerning recent French 
interventionism in Africa (OLIVEIRA et al., 2013).
France is militarily present in several South Atlantic African 
countries. As of 2016, its main deployments are in Mali, Côte 
D’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal, with roughly 
4,000 soldiers spread among these countries (IISS, 2016). Besides 
that, France maintains an amphibious assault ship on notice in the 
23  The most recent incident which almost led to open war between the two 
countries was the so-called “Lobster War” in the 1960s. At that time, France 
repeatedly violated Brazilian jurisdictional waters to capture lobsters despite 
several warnings coming from Brasília. France and Brazil have even deployed 
warships to the northernmost region of the South Atlantic, but both countries 
agreed to diffuse tension and accepted international mediation to solve the 
dispute, which in the end favored Brazil (RAFFAELLI, 2003; LESSA, 1999; 
CARVALHO, 1999).
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Gulf of Guinea (IISS, 2016). The French Navy has 38,250 soldiers, 
including 2,200 of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (IISS, 2016). France 
possesses four submarines armed with nuclear missiles, six tactical 
submarines, one aircraft carrier, 11 destroyers, 11 frigates, 20 patrol 
vessels, 18 ships for mine countermeasures, 45 amphibious ships, 
and 145 ships for logistics and support (IISS, 2016). Moreover, in 
the French Guyana—on the limits with the South Atlantic—France 
has around 2,100 troops and, in the Caribbean, it has 1,000 soldiers 
(IISS, 2016).
Yet, despite all wariness, Brazil signed a strategic military 
agreement with France to modernize its navy in 2008. France would 
jointly build with Brazil five submarines, one powered by a nuclear 
reactor (of Brazilian technology) and four conventional ones. France 
assists in the design and construction of the non-nuclear parts, 
mainly the hull (IISS, 2013). All submarines are to be manufactured 
in Brazil, meaning that it is a deal which includes technology 
transfer. The first one is to be delivered in 2023. Furthermore, 
France has also assisted Brazil with the mapping of its ocean floor. 
Both countries have also worked together in rescue operations in 
the South Atlantic between Brazil and Senegal/Cape Verde.
5 THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IN BRAZILIAN STRATEGY 
5.1 Domestic policies
In 2004, the Brazilian Navy launched a concept called “Blue 
Amazon”, which is a plea at the UN for the extension of the 
country’s continental shelf. Map 2 depicts the area that would be 
added to the Brazilian territory. If the plea is fully accepted by the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Brazil’s 
territory would increase 50%. In 2007, the CLCS validated 81% of 
the plea. For the remaining 19% Brazil prepared other proposals, 
which are currently being analyzed by the Commission (PEREIRA 
DA SILVA, 2013).
Since the 2000s, Brazil has adopted several policies to fully 
survey and protect the Blue Amazon and to guarantee its presen-
ce in the South Atlantic. Regarding maritime resources, two 
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programs, PROAREA and Biomar, have been developed. They deal 
with prospection and exploration of mineral and living resources 
in the South Atlantic, respectively. Related to these programs, the 
Survey Program of the Brazilian Continental Shelf initiative was 
implemented. PROAREA’s studies also led to a UN authorization 
for Brazil to explore minerals of the Rio Grande Elevation in the 
high seas of the ocean in 2014.24
Map 1: The Blue Amazon
Key: Blue = territorial sea. Green = ZEE. Red: the Brazilian claim.
Source: Folha de S. Paulo (s.d.).
24 For more information on the Rio Grande Elevation, see Aquino et al. (2016).
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On issues of scientific research in the South Atlantic, Brazil 
has taken on two programs: Protrindade and Proantar. The former 
aims at the development of the Trindade archipelago, part of one 
of the insular trampolines. The latter includes initiatives which 
involve research of the Antarctic, survey, and exploration of 
neighboring cold waters of the South Atlantic. Similar to these, 
the Proarquipélago program is a policy for research in all Brazilian 
South Atlantic islands. It is implemented by the Brazilian Navy, 
which strives to guarantee that all islands are permanently 
inhabited. This way Brazil guarantees a larger ZEE in the South 
Atlantic.
Brazil has also started to develop the Blue Amazon Management 
System (SisGAAz). This system will be used for both civilian and 
military purposes, since it includes an ambitious surveillance 
system. All technologies used in SisGAAz are being designed by 
Brazilian companies. Although it is supposed to enter into full 
operation by 2027, it has been indefinitely suspended by the Navy 
due to budgetary constraints (STOCHERO, 2015). There is also 
some speculation that foreign companies might join the project 
(SANTAYANA, 2015).
5.2 Current naval capabilities and procurement programs
Brazil’s Defense White Paper (2012) and the National Defense 
Policy (2005) state that the South Atlantic is strategic for the 
security of the country. Denying the command of the ocean to 
foreign powers is one of its main goals, which has driven the 
Navy’s development at least since 2005. 
Brazil has 69,000 soldiers on duty in its navy. The coun-
try possesses five tactical submarines, one aircraft carrier, three 
destroyers, 10 frigates, 48 patrol vessels, five ships for anti-mine 
warfare, 38 amphibious ships, and more than a hundred ships for 
logistics and support (IISS, 2016). Despite being the largest and 
strongest navy among South Atlantic countries, it is still meager 
in comparison with the extra-regional powers France, UK, and the 
US. Hence, Brazil does not feel threatened by its neighbors, but it is 
very apprehensive towards interference from “powers outside the 
BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES
318  |  TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 295-322, 2016
region” (IISS, 2013; ALBRECHT, 2011). Brazil fears a foreign inva-
sion of the Amazon forest as well as of the Blue Amazon. Former 
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Defense, Celso Amorim, 
provided examples of possible threats to Brazil which include only 
scenarios involving the South Atlantic. Amorim (2013) distincti-
vely mentions the capacity of exploring deepwater oil reserves 
and maritime routes as Brazil’s main vulnerabilities in the ocean.
Despite being the fourth largest navy of the countries conside-
red in this paper, as can be seen on Table 1, most of the Brazilian 
Navy’s warships and equipments need replacement and moder-
nization (BRITES; MARTINS; SILVA, 2013). This has been Brazil’s 
permanent goal since 2000. The Navy has carried out investments 
in the development of a nuclear submarine through the Submarine 
Development Program (PROSUB) and the Plan of Articulation and 
Equipment of the Brazilian Navy (PAEMB). While the nuclear tech-
nology is going to be 100% Brazilian, France is supposed to trans-
fer technologies for the complete development of the submarine. 
According to the Brazilian National Defense Strategy, the country 
is supposed to build 15 conventional submarines plus six nuclear 
ones (BRASIL, 2005). There is no official deadline, even though the 
first ones should become operational in 2023.
The Brazilian Navy also intends to renew its surface fleet. 
One of the main programs for that is the PROSUPER, which plans 
the domestic construction of five frigates, five patrol vessels and 
one logistics support vessel. Several European and East Asian 
countries have already demonstrated their intentions of develo-
ping partnerships with Brazil for that purpose (OLIVEIRA; CEPIK; 
BRITES, 2013). Even so, budgetary constraints have affected most 
of the procurement programs aimed at modernization and acqui-
sition of capabilities, including PROSUPER, which was suspended 
in 2011. PROSUB is the only program which does not suffer signi-
ficantly from such problems. The construction of conventional 
and nuclear-powered submarines has been maintained despite 
economic shortcomings, while the construction and acquisition of 
other kinds of warships has been interrupted (ALBRECHT, 2011; 
THE BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 295-322, 2016   |  319
IISS, 2013).25 However, recent fiscal austerity measures may cause 
a 4-year delay to PROSUB (STOCHERO, 2015).
Table 1: South Atlantic navies
Source: made by the author with data from IISS (2016).
The Brazilian National Defense Strategy notes submarines, 
especially nuclear-powered ones, are essential for “sea-denial” 
capabilities (BRASIL, 2005; 2012). As such, Brazil wants to have a 
proactive posture for Blue Amazon defense. To sponsor research 
and business initiatives in areas related to PROSUB, Brazil created 
the state-owned defense company Amazul (Blue Amazon Defense 
Technologies) in 2012. It was activated in August 2013 and it has 
been providing assistance to build submarines and other warships 
for the Brazilian Navy. Amazul has been seen as a means to push 
forward PROSUPER, but its first results may come only in 2026.
Together, PROSUB, PROSUPER, and SisGAAz could grant Brazil 
force-projection capabilities consistent with global-power status, 
but delays in their procurement make everything uncertain (IISS, 
2013). In the end, the modernization of the Navy:
[…] hinges on the health of the overall 
economy, and on how much Brazil sees 
state-of-the-art military hardware necessary 
to sustain its international political ambitions. 
The absence of a conventional strategic 
threat in the region and, more recently, slow 
economic growth contribute to a reluctance 
to make defence spending a priority (IISS, 
2013, p. 429).
Indeed, the economic crisis that hit Brazil in 2014 severely impac-
ted the Navy’s strategic projects. SisGAAz has been suspended and 
25 See the work of Martins Filho (2011; 2014) for more information about 
PROSUB’s development through the years.
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PROSUB may suffer a delay of up to four years. PROSUPER remains 
inactive. Austerity measures taken by President Dilma Rousseff in 
2015 and by Michel Temer’s government in 2016 have endangered 
their fulfillment. Yet, they still remain priority projects within the 
Navy. It remains to be seen whether the current political crisis will 
negatively affect them in the long run.
5.3 Analysis of Brazil’s geopolitical strategy towards the South 
Atlantic 
Considering the South Atlantic relations conducted by Brazil, 
the country’s geopolitical strategy in the 2000s appears to be rather 
defensive (e.g. BOHOU, 2007). On the multilateral level, Brazil 
fosters the ZPCSA, a South Atlantic regional grouping which does 
not include extra-regional powers. It has also tried to empower 
and foster the development of South Atlantic countries bilaterally. 
For sure this is not an uninterested approach since much of this 
bilateral cooperation also stimulates Brazil’s own economic deve-
lopment. However, Brazilian initiatives do aim at stability in the 
South Atlantic. Considering that almost all of Brazil’s international 
trade is carried out through sea routes, a war (or instability) in the 
ocean is undesirable.
Historically, Brazil has suffered from threats or even aggression 
from the extra-regional powers considered in the research: the 
US, France, and the UK. This has understandably created a certain 
suspicion in Brazil. Still, this caution has not impeded friendly 
engagement with them. Brazil has joined military exercises with 
the US and has bought warships from the UK. Partnership with 
France is rather deeper, since it includes assistance to submarine 
construction with high levels of technology transfer. This is a clear 
sign that Brazil’s stance is not against these countries in spite of 
their turbulent history.
Nonetheless, it is exactly because of past experiences that 
Brazil has sought to increase its Navy’s military capabilities, which 
are markedly weaker than the ones from France, the UK and the 
US. PROSUB, PROSUPER and SisGAAz are clear examples of an 
aspiration to modernize the Brazilian Navy. However, the Brazilian 
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civilian and military policies towards the South Atlantic do not 
indicate that the country is trying to have a general command 
over the ocean. Mapping, research, and development programs, 
together with the acquisition of submarines and implementation 
of monitoring systems, indicate that Brazil has been struggling 
to guarantee a permanent local command over its jurisdictional 
waters only. This means that Brazil wants to make sure that no 
country can interfere with its civilian or military activities in the sea.
Furthermore, Brazil has tried to enhance the capabilities 
of African countries, but it has not sought the establishment of 
naval bases in the African coast. Brazil does have permanent 
naval missions in Namibia and Cape Verde, but they are far from 
being military bases of the Brazilian Navy, considering there are 
very few military attachés and no warships at all. These initiatives 
point rather to the conclusion that Brazil tries to empower those 
African states to make them able to deal with internal instabili-
ties without the help of extra-regional powers, whose interventio-
nist presence in Africa raises Brazilian discontentment. Tellingly, 
in 2010, Portugal put on the table the idea of extending NATO’s 
scope to the South Atlantic and the Brazilian Minister of Defense 
criticized it and affirmed it would be unwelcome and detrimental 
to the region.26
This strategy, however, does not mean that Brazil challenges 
the status quo on the South Atlantic. The UK possesses most of the 
islands of the insular trampolines and the US has the most powerful 
fleet. Brazil does not seem to challenge their general command of 
the South Atlantic. Certainly, Brazil wants to deny them command 
over its jurisdictional waters, but their standing on international 
trading routes remains unchallenged. The only exception being the 
Malvinas/Falklands, in which case Brazil supports the Argentinean 
claim over the islands, but even then only timidly.
26 This closely resembles the project of establishing a NATO-equivalent 
alliance in the South Atlantic, SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization). It was 
rejected by Brazil and Nigeria in the 1980s.
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6 CONCLUSION
Brazil has a clear maritime vocation. Geographically the coun-
try is inclined towards the ocean and, in the 21st century, there 
has been political will to take advantage of this through many 
policies. Regional integration of South America fosters develop-
ment, peace, and stability. Brazilian policies towards sub-Saharan 
African countries seem to have the same purpose.
This paper sought to explain the Brazilian geopolitical stra-
tegy towards the South Atlantic since 2000. The hypothesis was 
that Brazil has been seeking command over the ocean through 
the control of strategically important positions and through the 
curbing of extra-regional powers’ influence in the region. It is only 
partially confirmed, because Brazil has not tried to establish mili-
tary bases on geopolitically important locations nor challenged 
British possession over most of its South Atlantic islands. Brazilian 
initiatives point to a geopolitical strategy of ensuring sovereig-
nty and independence rather than confrontation to established 
powers. Attempts to curb extra-regional powers’ influence seek 
greater autonomy, not only for Brazil itself but also for all South 
Atlantic countries considered in the research.
As Corbett (1911) put it, the command of the sea, in times of 
peace, is a rhetorical expression that means a country has adequate 
naval positions and fleet to secure the actual command when war 
breaks out. Brazil has not tried to acquire naval positions outside its 
jurisdictional waters since 2000. On the other hand, Brazilian geopo-
litical strategy has aimed at securing a permanent local command 
of the Blue Amazon, i.e. protecting its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity (for instance, through SisGAAz and PROSUB). Historically, 
extra-regional powers have threatened and even waged war against 
Brazil in order to conquer territory or for purely commercial reasons. 
Therefore, Brazil’s main goal is to have command of its own waters 
so that these scenarios do not come to happen again.
One can see from this geopolitical strategy that Brazil has had a 
defensive yet very firm posture in its international relations. Brazil 
has resolutely affirmed its sovereignty and strived towards greater 
independence vis-à-vis extra-regional powers present in the South 
Atlantic, with whom it has maintained friendly relations, even if some-
times marred by suspicions. Therefore, it has been a peaceful rise and, 
depending on Brazil, it will keep on going through the same path.
